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Comparative Capitalism without Capitalism, and Production without Workers: The 
Limits and Possibilities of Contemporary Institutional Analysis 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The aim of this paper is to consider the extent to which the comparative capitalism 
literature fully reflects the available empirical evidence in its attempts to model different 
versions of capitalism, and in particular whether it adequately captures the roles of 
diverse stakeholders within the capitalist system. In doing so, particular attention is 
accorded to the varieties of capitalism literature, business systems theory and regulation 
theory. In addition, there is reflection in the paper on whether any strand of the literature 
is able to deal effectively with the recent economic crisis and systemic change. It is 
argued that more attention needs to be devoted to exploring the structural causes of 
change, and the marginalization of the interests of key social groupings, most notably 
workers, from the process of institutional redesign.   
 
Introduction 
 
The last few decades have witnessed an increased interest in characterizing differences 
between capitalist economies according to specific institutional configurations that are 
alleged to have particular capabilities to promote distinct logics in terms of economic 
outcomes. The intended purpose of such endeavours is to make comparisons between 
these various institutional configurations in terms of their relative merits in facilitating 
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the achievement of specific declared economic objectives such as µefficiency¶ or 
µcompetitiveness¶. Although the idea of convergence to one particular set of economic 
and political structures as envisaged in the µEnd of History¶ thesis (Fukuyama 1992) has 
become somewhat dated, researchers and commentators on management continue to be 
influenced by notions of µbest practice¶ within competing versions of capitalism and how 
they may be transplanted from one context to another in pursuit of better economic 
performance. 
One distinct theme that has emerged from the wealth of recent comparative 
analysis which will be of interest to management scholars is the emphasis that has been 
given to the firm as a central actor within wider institutional frameworks concerned with 
the organizing and co-ordination of economic relationships. In particular, questions have 
EHHQDVNHGDERXWKRZDILUP¶VFDSDELOLWLHVDQGLWVHIIHFWLYHQHVVLQPDQDJLQJLWVLQWHUQDO
processes and resources is encouraged or constrained by its strategic interaction with the 
external institutional environments that confront it. In exploring this literature, we aim 
not only to assess the merits of the different approaches to the analysis of these issues but 
also to critically investigate how far attempts to match particular firm characteristics with 
specific macro-level institutional configurations take account of the degree of the 
heterogeneity of actual organizational operations and activities. We also examine how 
effectively change is theorized both in terms of continuities but also discontinuities with 
previous developments. This analysis is important for conceptualizing how far particular 
firm characteristics may have contributed to, or been subsequently affected by, change 
resulting from crises such as that which occurred in 2008.  
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 While the literature on comparative political economy is vast, this paper is 
focused specifically on examining and providing a critique of well-known branches of 
socio-economic theory that have been used to evaluate firmV¶FDSDFLW\WRPDQDJHWKHLU
internal and external relationships and the institutional contexts within which they are 
situated. Rather than simply attempting to undertake a systematic review of the literature 
employing a keyword search, our selection of relevant literature reflects our focus on the 
key authors, texts and subsequent discussion and criticism of three principle comparative 
DSSURDFKHVWRFRQFHSWXDOL]LQJWKHLQVWLWXWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHVRIGLIIHUHQWµYHUVLRQV¶RI
capitalism: WKHµvarieties of capitalism¶ literature (see, for example, Hall and Soskice 
2001), business systems theory (see, for example, Whitley 2001) and regulation theory 
(see, for example, Boyer 2002; 2011). :HXVHWKHWHUPµFRPSDUDWLYHFDSLWDOLVP¶WRGUDZ
together these different strands of literature.  Essentially, therefore, this term implies the 
comparing of national configurations and firm level practices from a socio-economic 
starting point, rather than accounts flowing from the mainstream economics literature, 
which accord primacy to a single over-riding institutional feature (such as property rights, 
as emphasized by La Porta and colleagues (c.f. La Porta et al. 1999) that provides 
incentives and disincentives to rational actors. 
We have explained our search for relevant literature in more detail within the 
methods section. Our approach has had to be selective as it is not possible to do full 
justice to the undeniably vast literature on comparative capitalism in a short paper. 
Amongst the omissions, it is important to acknowledge that this paper does not assess, for 
example, the work of the historical institutionalists (see, for example, Thelen 2001 and 
Streeck 2009; 2012), which has underpinned some of the recent developments and 
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extensions of the literature, and nor does it cover dependency theory  in any depth. 
However, these perspectives are drawn upon, where relevant, in order to critique the three 
main branches of theory under review. Further branches of theory that critically engage 
with the existing managerial literature include the critical management studies, 
Foucauldian and labour process branches of literature. The former two add insights into 
the nature of work in the context of different production regimes, while the latter engages 
with micro-politics within firms (see, for example, Braverman 1974; Thompson and 
Vincent 2010 for examples of the latter strand). Although each potentially provides 
useful and critical reflections on the current capitalist system, they will not be covered 
here, since this paper seeks to critique the comparative capitalism literature.    
In undertaking this review our aim is to consider the extent to which the three key 
streams of comparative capitalism literature fully reflect the trends in firm behavior 
within the global economic system that are relevant to the issues they consider. In 
particular, we explore whether this literature adequately captures the roles of diverse 
stakeholders within the capitalist system, and then consider whether any strand of this 
literature is able to deal effectively with the recent economic crisis and issues of systemic 
change. It is argued that more attention needs to be devoted, firstly, to exploring the 
structural causes of change and, secondly, to the marginalization of the interests of key 
social groupings, most notably workers, within such debates. This is in contrast to 
previous reviews which have considered, for example, the relevance of business systems 
theory to the study of multinationals and international institutions (Morgan 2007a; 
Wilkins et al. 2010), and pointed to the need to consider diversity within countries (see, 
for example, Allen 2004; Morgan 2007b).  
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 In reviewing the three comparative approaches to versions of capitalism, 
particular attention is directed towards the challenges that appear to be inherent in 
seeking to unpack and compare undeniably diverse national systems within broad 
categories, and the problems involved in attempts to reconcile them over time and space 
with structural developments in firms and institutions. In examining these difficulties it 
has been possible to indicate common limitations amongst the different approaches 
reviewed here and to suggest possible future agendas. 
The paper is structured as follows. Firstly, the methods used are outlined. 
Secondly, the principle strands of the literature on comparative capitalism that provide 
the focus for our review- namely the Varieties of Capitalism Approach, Business Systems 
Theory and Regulation Theory - are introduced. The relative strengths and weaknesses of 
each approach are examined and critically appraised. Thirdly, the paper highlights the 
limitations and possibilities of such approaches to understanding the present crisis. Where 
appropriate, we critique these important strands of thinking through drawing on relevant 
political economy literature.   
    
Methods 
 
The methods used to select literature for review were influenced by our specific aims to, 
firstly, explore whether the comparative capitalism literature adequately captures the 
roles of diverse stakeholders within the capitalist system and, secondly, to consider its 
relevance to the recent economic crisis and issues of systemic change. A systematic 
review of the literature was not employed for the purpose of this paper, due to its limited 
YDOXHJLYHQWKHSDSHU¶VDLPV,QVWHDGZHFDUULHGRXWDµWUDGLWLRQDO¶UHYLHZVHHIRU
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example, Macpherson and Jones 2010). However, in order to check that we had covered 
relevant literature, as shown in Table 1, we carried out a supplementary search of sources 
published between 1995 and 2012 within the Web of Science, JStor and Scopus 
databases. The search of JStor was carried out in 2012, and then updated in June 2013, 
when the Scopus database was also searched. The Web of Science search was initially 
carried out in 2012 and then updated in August 2013. As was mentioned above, the term 
µFRPSDUDWLYHFDSLWDOLVP¶LVDQRYHUDUFKLQJWHUPIRUGLIIHUHQWVWUDQGVRIOLWHUDWXUHDQGRXU
search needed to unpack this combined term (see the useful discussion in Ortenblad 
2010). 7KLVZDVDFKLHYHGWKURXJKVHDUFKLQJIRUUHODWHGWHUPVVXFKDVµ9DULHWLHVRI
&DSLWDOLVP¶µ%XVLQHVV6\VWHPV7KHRU\¶µ5HJXODWLRQ7KHRU\¶µEXVLQHVVV\VWHPV¶
µFDSLWDOLVP¶DQGµLQVWLWXWLRQV¶ We discarded the search results that did not seem relevant 
to the concerns of the paper. Where excessive results were found, filtering processes were 
employed to exclude sources, using advanced search options. Thus, where searches 
allowed, we included both theoretical and empirical sources in peer-reviewed journals, 
books chapters and books, and filtered out irrelevant or inappropriate work such as that 
relating to psychology or the natural sciences (c.f. Meier 2011). More specifically, the 
JStor search included: title and abstract, for articles and books, from 1995-2012, 
including only items published in English. The Scopus search included title, abstract and 
keywords, searching articles published from 1995-2012 within the field of social 
sciences. The Web of Science search involved an advanced search for titles of articles 
within the field of social sciences, published in English between 1995 and 2012. 
 
Table 1 here 
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The selection of relevant literature focuses attention on the key authors, texts and 
subsequent discussion and criticism of three principle comparative approaches to 
conceptualizing the institutional structures of diffHUHQWµYHUVLRQV¶RIFDSLWDOLVm: the 
µYDULHWLHVRIFDSLWDOLVP¶OLWHUDWXUHEXVLQHVVV\VWHPVWKHRU\DQGUHJXODWLRQWKHRU\Key 
texts and authors were determined through the relevance of coverage within each 
publication to the aims of this paper; our approach has had to be selective as it was not 
possible to do full justice to the undeniably vast literature that broadly relates to 
comparative capitalism within a short paper. 
 
Comparative capitalism literature  
 
The comparative capitalism literature essentially seeks to explain firm behaviour within a 
GHVLJQDWHGµcountry¶ context. While the three approaches we consider here variously take 
as their starting point the ways in which firm production alters over time, they each focus 
on different explanatory variables. The Varieties of Capitalism approach is concerned 
with how the nature of relationships between a firm and the institutional context in which 
it operates leads to competitiveness; Business Systems Theory prioritizes the importance 
of relationships between a firm and its internal (e.g. employees) and external (e.g. the 
state) stakeholders; Regulation theory emphasizes the importance of developments in the 
regulatory framework and social relations,. 
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Varieties of capitalism 
 
Within the 1990s, variations in the performance of liberal market and more coordinated 
economies sparked an interest in the relationship between inter and intra firm relations 
and national competitiveness (Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990). Dore (2000) distinguished 
between liberal market economies (LMEs) such as the UK and the US, and coordinated 
market economies (CMEs) such as Germany and Japan. The former were, he argued, 
characterized by short term relationships and the latter by longer term ones. Thus in 
LMEs, a firm had short term relationships with its financial backers, short term loyalties 
to its employees, whom it could hire and fire at will, and consequently had low levels of 
commitment to training. Conversely, in CMEs, firms had longer term relationships with 
financial institutions that were built on trust and saw employees as more than a short term 
resource. 
 In a particularly influential 2001 edited collection, Hall and Soskice (2001: 6) 
argue that firms are centres of webs of social and economic relations and that these 
provide the operational context within which firms seek to exploit their core 
competencies and dynamic capabilities. Firm competitiveness is, inter alia, dependent on 
how successfully the institutional structures of national political economies facilitate a 
firm¶V ability to resolve the problems posed by the need to co-ordinate and manage its 
internal and external relationships in five specified spheres (Hall and Soskice 2001: 6-7). 
These spheres include: industrial relations, where the firm needs to co-ordinate national 
and local bargaining over wages, working conditions and productivity levels, and manage 
relationships with unions; vocational training and education, which will influence the 
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ways in which the firm seeks to secure suitable skills for its workforce; corporate 
governance, particularO\WKHILUP¶VQHHGWRPDQDJHUHODWLRQVZLWKSURYLGHUVRIILQDQFH; 
relations with other employers, the state, communities and other social actors such as 
business associations; and finally relations with their own employees so that they have 
the appropriate resources, WUDLQLQJDQGOHYHOVRIFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHILUP¶VREMHFWLYHV. The 
nature of WKHILUP¶s relationships with different actors and institutions may make specific 
types of work relations possible, through ensuring that employees have the necessary 
core competencies and skills, and appropriate levels of cooperation between peers and 
superiors. In specific contexts, workers may develop specialized information that helps to 
promote competitiveness but may also withhold effort or information about, for example, 
RSHUDWLRQDOGHWDLOVRISURGXFWLRQSURFHVVHVWKDWPD\XQGHUPLQHWKHILUP¶VHIIRUWVWREH
competitive (Hall and Soskice 2001: 7).   
A number of weaknesses in the Varieties of Capitalism literature have been 
identified. Firstly, as Dore (2008) acknowledges, occasional adventures into empiricism 
notwithstanding, the early Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature has tended to discuss 
abstract institutions rather than examine what is happening in the real world. For 
example, Hall and Soskice largely confine their own analysis to very general statements, 
such as³«PDQ\ILUPVLQFRRUGLQDWHGPDUNHWHFRQRPLHVHPSOR\SURGXFWLRQVWUDWHJLHV
WKDWUHO\RQDKLJKO\VNLOOHGODERUIRUFH´+DOODQG6RVNLFHand ³«HPSOR\HU
DVVRFLDWLRQVDQGXQLRQVPDNHGHDOV«´ 
Secondly, VoC accounts do not take account of regional differences between 
firms within many of the alleged national archetypes (Lane and Wood 2009). Whilst an 
obvious example of the latter would be security of tenure (Estevez-Abe et al. 2001: 154), 
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other examples include the uneven nature of unionization and variations in staff turnover 
rates according to sector (Goergen et al.. 2009). As Peck and Theodore (2007) note, 
homogenizing processes are mediated through regional and other sub-national 
subordinate institutions and other regulatory features. Thirdly, although the literature 
involves firm centered analysis, there is relatively little discussion about what actually 
goes on in the firm, especially at the point of production. 
 Critics have also charged that the VoC literature ignores diversity and that the two 
models of LME and CME are too restrictive for analytical purposes (Bosch et al. 2010: 
26). Whilst more recent literature within this genre has expanded the analysis to 
encompass mixed models of economies such as those encountered in Mediterranean and 
Eastern Europe (Hancke et al. 2007), it has again battled to gain traction in accurately 
describing the variety and diversity both within and between these economies. In the case  
of Eastern Europe, the concept of an Emerging Market Economy (EME) was floated by 
Hancke et al.. (2007), but more detailed analysis has revealed that these economies 
hardly represent a coherent bloc at all (Lane and Myant 2007). For example, whilst it 
could be argued that Estonia has adopted some features of the liberal market model, it 
remains heavily reliant on Scandinavian foreign direct investment, which, in turn, is 
likely to shape the practices of at least some key firms. Moreover, whilst there is a strong 
case that Slovenia is now an orthodox CME, and Slovakia has made some significant 
steps in this direction, the latter has not achieved a smooth process of transition (see, for 
example, Adam et al.. 2009). This has led some writers to suggest that some of the more 
prosperous Eastern European countries, such as the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary 
and Slovakia constitute a variety of market economy in their own right, the Dependent 
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Market Economy (DME) (Noelke and Vliegenthart 2009). However, this category 
appears somewhat tenuous in the aftermath of the financial crisis, given, for example, the 
radical divergence in the fortunes of Hungary and Slovakia. Moreover, the DME model 
becomes increasingly difficult to sustain once account is taken of the diversity of states 
such as Kosovar, Moldova, Macedonia and Bulgaria at the Eastern European periphery. 
 In the case of Latin America, it has been argued that countries may constitute 
Hierarchical Market Economies (HMEs), which are characterized by a high degree of 
labour market segmentization, few (albeit diversified) large firms and decentralized 
labour relations (Schneider 2009). However, again, this masks much diversity, notably 
between large economies with significant industrial bases (e.g. Brazil), through to those 
that are heavily reliant on narcotics (e.g. post-coup Honduras). The same problem has 
beset attempts to apply the literature to Asia where the extensive variations in 
institutional capabilities make even the derivation of multiple archetypes (let alone one) 
very difficult. Moreover, as dependency theory alerts us, the relatively poor performance 
of some nations may be closely bound up with the relative prosperity of others (see, for 
example, Kay 2011). This may be particularly relevant to post-colonial economies. The 
impact of nations on each RWKHU¶VIRUWXQHVDWNH\IRUPDWLYHKLVWRULFDOPRPHQWVDQG
inequalities in their dealings with each other remains an issue somewhat neglected by the 
literature on comparative capitalism.   
A further criticism of the VoC literature is that it makes the assumption that 
national archetypes are more rigid and static than is actually the case (Bosch et al.. 2009). 
The danger of such arguments is that they can retreat into a narrow functionalist view that 
a system either works and persists or does not (Hopner 2005: 340-341). In reality, 
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systems that are at best only partially functional may nevertheless persist for sustained 
periods, working e[WUHPHO\ZHOOIRUVRPHµLQVLGHU¶ players, even if they are dysfunctional 
to the bulk of society (Wood and Frynas 2006). A further point to note, as Bosch et al.. 
(2010: 137) indicate, is that µchanges in behaviours within sets of institutions may be as 
important DVWKHLQVWLWXWLRQVWKHPVHOYHV¶(see also Goyer 2011). Hence, Kelly and Frege 
(2004: 183) argue that actors retain considerable room tRµshape their oZQGHVWLQLHV¶, 
while Jessop (2011) notes that interests may not only be heterogeneous, but may be also 
intrinsically antagonistic.  
 
Business systems theory 
 
Although often conflated with the VoC approach (see Thompson and Vincent 2008: 58), 
Business Systems Theory (BST) actually predates it (see Whitley and Kristensen 1997; 
Whitley 1999). The main theme of BST in its approach to the comparative analysis of 
market economies and the factors that shape firm competitiveness is that differences in 
societal institutions encourage or discourage particular kinds of economic organization. 
Consequently the characteristics of the firm, its pattern of organization and its 
interactions with other social actors are seen as reflecting different models of capitalism. 
A key difference with the VoC approach is that BST accords much more attention to the 
relative role of the state and, more specifically, the central role of the developmental state 
in non-LME types of capitalism (Hancke et al.. 2007: 15). This role includes facilitating 
the development of corporatist and neo-corporatist arrangements including involving 
worker institutions in government but also, more particularly, promoting the development 
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of specific sectors of industry. Hence, authors such as Whitley (1999: 33) pay 
considerable attention to the manner in which market relationships are mediated through 
the state and associated structures. :KLWOH\¶VFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQRIWKHVWDWHLVWKDWLWUHVWV
on dominant coalitions between elites (see also Amable 2008: 774), but reigns in the 
demands of different groupings within these elites (Olson 1982). However, a long period 
of extended crisis may make such coalitions more difficult to sustain, and lead to possibly 
terminal rupture between elites and the rank-and-file. 
 A criticism of the BST literature is that it does not go far in evaluating why states 
are competitive. For example, the assumption that the competitiveness of liberal market 
economies rests on a less active state discounts the role of the enormous and interlocking 
military-industrial, security and penal complexes in the United States, and, indeed, the 
extent to which the high technology sector is supported not only through development 
agencies, but also through research and development by the state and not-for-profit 
sectors (including universities)1. The most recent developments of BST have begun to 
address this lacuna, but, at best, only partially (see Allen and Whitley 2011). For 
example, whilst employment relations in the high technology sector, and indeed, within 
many areas of the military industrial complex (most notably consulting and private 
military contracting) may be characterized by individualized employment relations, this 
is not always the case. This is particularly evident in traditional manufacturers of military 
hardware (e.g. Boeing and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers)2.   
 Another distinction between the VoC and BST literature is that BST accords more 
attention to the defining features of employer-employee relationships, albeit again 
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through the use of stylized ideal types, in other words, summarizing distinguishing 
features of particular sets of national models in their purest forms, and stylized in that 
they do not provide a full empirical description of a more complex social reality. For 
example, Whitley refers to the organization of firm structures and control systems as well 
as the interdependence of employers and employees (Whitley 1999; 2007), and argues 
that the nature of the firm will vary according to the relative importance of a range of 
stakeholders, consisting not only of owners, managers and business partners, but also 
including different categories of employee (Whitley 1999). In µFRPSDUWPHQWDlized 
EXVLQHVVV\VWHPV¶VXFKDVWKH8. employer-employee interdependence will be low, 
reflecting competitive labour markets and relatively weak unions (Whitley 1999). In 
more µcollaborative and coordinated business systems¶such as Germany, firms will be 
more dependent on the firm and industry skills base of existing employees, going hand in 
hand with stronger unions and co-ordinated decision making (Whitley 2000). Within 
these economies there is also a strong emphasis on diversified quality production, 
formalized wage determination, industry specific training, high levels of commitment and 
problem solving and collaboration (Whitley 2010: 379). However, as with VoC, it can be 
argued that there is too much reliance on stylized ideal types and that therefore there is 
too much attention paid to rules and formal process, rather than exploring how they are 
acted out on a day-to-day basis. Nonetheless, as Amable (2008) notes, a strength of the 
approach is that it does not assume that heterogeneity is pathological or a sign of 
systemic decay. Indeed, for these reasons more recent analyses have used BST to explore 
the complexities of different forms of firm behaviour within emerging economies (Wood 
and Frynas 2006; Wood et al.. 2011). 
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Regulation theory 
 
Regulation theory (RT), originating in France, should not be confused because of its title 
with Anglo-Saxon notions of regulation of natural monopolies or collective services 
provided by public authorities (Boyer 2002). RT is essentially a theory of the capitalist 
production process, arguing that different means of production require certain institutions 
to sustain them. It examines geographical and historical variations in the institutional 
arrangements that define capitalist economies, paying particular attention to the ways in 
which any particular set of institutional arrangements may be destabilized and replaced 
by new arrangements through processes of political conflict and economic crisis. Thus, 
different production regimes are linked to particular forms of regulation and social 
relations but not necessarily in a stable form (Boyer 1990: 13-14). Initially, 57¶Vfocus 
was on how the labour process in the Fordist era, based on routinized processes and mass 
production, ran into crisis due to its internal contradictions and rigidities, and how other 
production paradigms emerged to replace it (Boyer 1990; Jessop 2001b: xxvi). There has 
been some debate regarding what in fact replaced Fordism as the dominant form of 
production. The range of candidates range from flexible automation, through Japanization 
to increased diversity in practice and outcomes (see Jessop 2001c). However, 
notwithstanding these debates, regulation theory is primarily focused on change over 
time. Moreover, it has not assumed that any production regime will necessarily be 
sustained over the longer term, and instead assumes that each stage of capitalism is 
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characterized by a long wave of growth and contraction (Jessop 2001a: xx). Systems are 
not believed to be inherently durable or stable (Hopner 2005; Jessop 2001a).   
 A limitation of early regulationist theory was the assumption that developed 
countries, which were characterized by broadly Fordist production paradigms, had to 
assume similar institutional forms (Amable 2003: 76). More recently, regulationist 
writing has accorded increasing attention not only to temporal, but also to spatial 
differences. For example, attention has been paid to comparing national social systems of 
production (Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997), and developing geographic theories of space 
and scale (see Collinge 2001). Other strands of regulationist thinking point to the 
coexistence of more than one type of regulation at a specific time (Jessop 2001b). 
Another important trend in contemporary regulationist writing has been a shift of 
emphasis away from a focus on the wage-labour nexus under fordism to firm level 
competition (Hopner 2005), and the changing role of the financial services industry 
(Aglietta and Riberioux 2005). Yet, at the same time, central to regulationist thinking 
remains the power imbalances between capital and labour, and the compromises and 
accommodations necessary to sustain a coherent pattern of growth.  
 Underlying different production regimes are important spatial and social 
variations in state capabilities. However, the coexistence of different capabilities may not 
necessarily be complementary, but also pathological (Jessop 2011: 226). An example of 
the latter is the coexistence of mega-exporting (Germany, China) and mega-importing 
nations (US, UK), with each seeking to offload the costs associated with their internal 
contradictions externally. Firms and nations may also seek to offload the associated costs 
and limitations of their present production onto future generations. A notable example in 
18 
 
this context would be the ways in which the environmental costs of specific types of 
production are temporally externalized (c.f. Boyer 2011; Jessop 2011). Another example 
of negative consequences is where the shareholder dominant model has resulted in the 
weakening of the countervailing power of other key stakeholders (such as workers), 
resulting, ironically, in more irresponsibility by senior management, rather than less 
(Aglietta and Riberioux 2005). 
 Regulation theory also draws links between different production regimes and the 
dynamics of business cycles and more serious crises (Boyer 1990: 13-14). However, as 
elements of the historical institutionalist literature acknowledge, change might happen as 
a result of other reasons such as war and elite composition. These factors are not 
adequately captured within regulationist writing. 
 The different strands of thinking and their relative weaknesses are simplified in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
Comparative capitalism literature and the economic crisis 
 
It could be argued that none of the literature from within the VoC, BST or RT traditions 
has, thus far, adequately captured the reasons behind the recent economic crisis. 
 The VoC literature, and by implication BST, is characterized by a linear 
conceptualization of history, and assumptions of orderly and coherent evolution 
(Hollingsworth 2006). Although the literature covers variety on the basis of scale, it fails 
to take account of temporal diversity. As a result, it does not offer an explanation for the 
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nature of the crisis, nor more generally for the factors that force episodic major systemic 
reordering. Yet, assumptions of linearity appear difficult to sustain in view of the 2008- 
financial crisis, and, indeed, what in retrospect, appears to have been a long period of 
systemic problems that stretch back to the 1970s (see Streeck 2012). At the same time, 
the continuing improvement of work and the bettering of the terms and conditions of 
employment that characterized the 1950s and 1960s may represent a historical anomaly, 
rather than something that can be revived. As noted by Lane and Wood (2011), Walter 
%HQMDPLQ¶VFRQFHSWRIWKH$QJHORI+LVWRU\VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHSURFHVVRIFKDQJHLVD
SDUWLDOO\GHVWUXFWLYHRQHWKHµUXEEOH¶ of past institutional regimes may be reconstructed, 
but the results will be inherently different to preceding regimes (see Benjamin 1978). We 
DUHDUJXDEO\PRYLQJWRZDUGDµULVNVRFLHW\¶EXWRQHZKHUHWKHUHDUHYDU\LQJSURFHVVHVRI
modernization at play in different world regions (Beck and Grande 2010: 422). 
The determining of causal factors is not straightforward. Goyer (2011: 35) points 
to the complexities of causality, with change taking place at both the firm level and that 
of institutions, not just one or the other. A further complication is that there might be 
incremental or radical systemic change (Goyer 2011). The former concerns the orderly 
development of an existing institutional framework, which may involve the reweighting 
of specific institutional features, their refinement, and/or gradual changes in their role 
(Boyer 2006). In contrast, radical systemic change involves a complete institutional 
transformation that will radically alter the relative position of key players (see Boyer 
2006; Streeck 2012). Consequently, it is important, as Amable and Palambarini (2009) 
point out, to draw a clear distinction between institutional crisis and systemic crisis. The 
implications of systemic crisis are many. In times of systemic crisis, there can be a lack 
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of stable political leadership and reforms may not garner sufficient socio-political support 
(Amable and Palambarini 2009: 138-139). Moreover, the crisis can be exacerbated by 
new influences, as shown by the role taken in the 2008- crisis by active fund managers 
rather than traditional institutional investors (Dore 2008: 782). In such circumstances, 
key interest groupings, such as workers, may be marginalized with the result that the 
social base of systemic change may be dangerously narrow. However, being firm-based, 
the VoC literature cannot satisfactorily integrate the broad political dimensions of 
systemic change. Rather, the VoC literature seems confined to viewing the development 
of national systems as a move towaUGVEHWWHUSUDFWLFHZLWKRQO\µQRUPDO¶ political 
rivalries and limited support for change precluding the gradual refinement of systems 
(Amable and Palambarini 2009: 123-124).   
Does regulation theory facilitate an explanation of the crisis? It could be argued 
that it goes further than VoC and BST theory, since it addresses change over time. 
Moreover, more recently, the regulationist emphasis on the temporality of existing 
institutional orders, and the inevitability of periodic systemic crises and change has 
increasingly been taken on board by the other principle strands of comparative 
institutionalist thinking (see Thelen 2010). However, the issue of causality still remains 
somewhat unanswered. Whilst certain actors may become more powerful than others at 
specific times, and this may be directly linked to systemic crisis, what remains unclear is 
why crises come at particular times. With regard to the 2008 crisis, there is a growing 
consensus that a key contributory factor has been the prominence of finance, but 
regulation theory does not go far in helping us to understand why finance has become so 
powerful. As the historical institutionalists alert us, at different times actors may be 
21 
 
compelled to engage in compromises they may find unwelcome not merely to sustain 
their own competitiveness, but in the interests of social stability or even national survival 
(see Sorge 2005; Streeck 2009; Thelen 2010). Therefore, during periods of extended 
crisis, political elites may be captured by narrow sub-class interests, constraining or 
confining the range of available alternatives at national level (Streeck 2012). Given that 
neither VoC, BST nor traditional RT go far enough in helping to explain the financial 
crisis, are there other possible explanations within the comparative institutionalist 
literature? We consider four sets of alternative explanations, but although we treat them 
separately for exposition purposes, the reality they seek to explain may in fact reflect a 
complex mix of all of them. Firstly, there are those accounts that are firmly rooted in the 
political economy tradition, which supplement rather than constitute an integral 
component of the literature on comparative capitalism, although more recent accounts by 
Streeck and Boyer (2012) have sought to link these bodies of literature. For example, 
Harvey (2007) argues that the present changes reflect an attempt by those previously 
dominant classes who had their influence diluted by the post-war social democratic 
settlements to reassert their position. More specifically, it can be argued that in today¶V
conditions, economic power firmly controls political power. Certainly, international 
ILQDQFH¶VSROLWLFDOSRZHUPDNHVLWSROLWLFDOO\XQDVVDLODEOH6WUHHFN). Indeed, 
according to Arrighi (2005: 85), over-accumulation of capital is a periodic and inevitable 
feature of capitalism and this leads to the rise in the prominence of rentiers. Yet, this rise 
may be the result of cooperation with other interest groups, rather than coercion (see the 
useful summDU\RI$UULJKL¶VZRUNLQ0DUHQV 2010). The prominence of rentiers, in turn, 
is likely to generate a new set of crises: the increasing power of the financial elites acts as 
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a barrier to reform, and worsens existing trends, with non-financial firms becoming 
increasingly dependent on speculators (Krippner 2005: 181). Consequently, the recent 
rise of finance may reflect, as Krippner (2012) argues, the outcome of a series of policy 
decisions which were essentially designed as a response to the crisis of the 1970s. 
Secondly, more recent extensions of the regulationist tradition can also make a 
contribution toward our understanding, since there have been attempts to comprehend the 
relationship between global crisis and contradictions in capitalism and national difference 
(Boyer 2011; Jessop 2011). The ongoing recession may be understood as simply a 
continuation of the crisis of Fordism, on the basis that productivity limits have been 
reached due to market saturation, the exhaustion of new technologies and/or in terms of 
social limits (full employment and the strength of organized labour) (Jessop 2001b: xxxv-
xxvi). Whilst the way forward has therefore been to strive for greater financial and 
numerical flexibility, these forms of flexibility have nevertheless themselves caused a 
great polarization in wealth, and persistent crises in demand which have only been 
temporarily resolved through unsustainable levels of borrowing, laying the basis for the 
present conundrum (Stiglitz 2012; Streeck 2011).   
 Thirdly, alternative explanations point toward external factors. Lipietz (2009) 
highlights the protracted nature of transitions between relatively stable periods of growth, 
and the complex and contradictory effects of a range of internal and external pressures. In 
particular, he points toward both energy and environmental issues. Similarly, Wood and 
Lane (2011) argue that radical systemic change has a strong exogenous component. They 
note that, just as the long crisis of the early twentieth century was associated with an 
energy transition from coal to oil, the present time is one where ± although demand is 
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rising ± the proportion of oil and gas as part of the global energy mix is declining. 
Although there has been a recent increase in the availability of oil and gas this has come 
from unconventional sources and is more expensive than was historically the case with 
traditional sources of supply. This long energy transition is marked by fundamental 
changes in energy prices which challenge the existing competitive basis of firms, sectors, 
and regions, and favour owners of highly fungible assets over those with infungible ones 
(the latter encompassing segments of capital and also workers) (Wood and Lane 2011). 
These categories somewhat transcend the traditional political economy conceptualization 
of rentiers and others: owners of highly fungible assets now include statist elements, such 
as sovereign wealth funds, as well as rentiers.  
 A fourth explanation is rooted in the idea that over time there are swings between 
the state and the market. In his classic writings on political economy, Polanyi (1944) 
argued that there is a long term process oIDµdoubOHPRYHPHQW¶, between state and 
market. At one point in time, society may seek to restrain the increasing problems of 
unrestrained markets through state led regulation. Over time, however, this mediation is 
challenged, and there is a counter-movement back towards less regulation. The VoC 
literature does address this, to some extent, but focuses on spatial rather than temporal 
differences. A further consideration is that there are arguably a limited range of 
functional combinations of rules and practices that are encountered at each pole, and 
there are VWURQJSUHVVXUHVDZD\IURPWKHµPLGGOHJURXQG¶ to one or other pole (Hancke et 
al.. 2007). Regulation theory also engages to some extent with the idea of the Polanyian 
double movement, but assumes that it LVµa FULVLVPHGLDWHGRQH¶ from one specific 
regularized regime to another, and that each regime brings with it its own set of internal 
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crisis tendencies (Jessop 2008). -HVVRSDOVRREVHUYHVWKDWFDSLWDOFDQQRWµJRLW
DORQH¶DQGDWVSHFLILFtimes is compelled to compromise with other societal interests, 
forming a hegemonic project. Recent historical institutionalist writings have also engaged 
with the swing between regulation and deregulation of markets. However, while Streeck 
(2009), for example, suggests that the trajectory followed by countries veering between 
state and market is marked by temporality, he argues that this is best characterized not so 
much as the swing of some hypothetical pendulum, but rather as a winding path.   
 What is likely to happen in the future? In the light of the current crisis, there may 
be a move towards a greater role for the state in the face of market induced crisis but the 
VWDWH¶VUROHmay assume a wide range of forms. For example, it may not engage in greater 
market regulation or the reconstruction of broadly based welfare states, but rather through 
the allocation of state assets and capabilities to support insider, oligarchic, segments of 
capital. As noted earlier, LMEs such as the US are already highly statist in several 
respects, ranging from the vast military industrial, security and penal complexes to the 
(sometimes interconnected) direct and indirect state support for the high technology 
sector. More recently, the gargantuan bailouts of the financial services industry bear 
HORTXHQWWHVWLPRQ\WRWKH6WDWH¶VZLOOLQJQHVVWRDFWWREHQHILWSDUWLFXODUVHFWLRQVRIFDSLWDO
XQGHUWKHJXLVHRIµGHDOLQJ¶ZLWKDFULVLVWKDWWKUHDWHQVDOO Indeed, there is a case to be 
made that the US may already have entered a phase of greater state mediation. However, 
DµFDSWXUHG¶ state may assume a role that is more pathological than developmental. A 
return to greater marketization may simply reflect the exhaustion of state resources and 
capabilities, rather than the renewed capability of markets to function effectively under 
lighter regulation.   
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 The alternative explanations, although necessarily reduced to core themes, are 
summarized in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper has sought to highlight limitations and emerging issues in two key areas: the 
OLWHUDWXUH¶VFRYHUDJHRIZRUNDQGHPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQVDQGLWVFRQFHSWXDOL]DWLRQVRI
state, market and systemic change. In the case of the former, there is a relative lack of 
analysis of the differences and similarity in the actual practice of work and employment 
relations within individual firms. This means that the way in which production systems 
actually work in different settings is relatively neglected (Gallie 2006; see Thompson and 
Vincent 2010: 58). Some strands of comparative capitalism literature go some way 
toward addressing this weakness. Drawing on regulationist theory, historical 
institutionalism, and, indeed, some of the VoC literature, Amable (2003) seeks to 
categorize countries according to commonalities and differences in five domains: product 
market competition; wage-labour nexus and labour-market institutions; financial systems 
and corporate governance; social protection and welfare; and education. Industrial 
relations are encompassed within the wage labour nexus and labour-market institutions, 
along with external rules, including job protection and employment protection (Amable 
2003).  This work draws on a broader basis of empirical evidence, albeit mostly extra-
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firm. However, there is still a relative neglect of variations in the specific dynamics of 
work organization.  
With regard to the state, market and systemic change, this review has shown that 
there is often an assumption that change is marked by a shift from one familiar form of 
mediation to another. Instead, it can be argued that both state and market may each 
assume very different roles. It is possible, for example, for a highly statist mediated 
system to be neither welfarist nor broadly developmentalist. Moreover, there is a lack of 
attention to how certain manifestations of institutional regulation and the ideology that 
supports them attain dominance at certain times (Jessop 2012). A further limitation of the 
comparative capitalism literature is related to where the primary level of analysis is 
nested, with much of the literature focusing on the vertical scale, whereby the primary 
level of analysis is the nation state, and therefore neglecting what actually goes on in 
particular organizations. To some extent, these dynamics are addressed by the critical 
management studies and labour process literatures (see, for example, Braverman 1974 
and Thompson and Vincent 2010 for a critical analysis of work within different 
production regimes). Additionally, the focus on dominant or presumed archetypical 
features within a particular national seWWLQJDOVRGLVFRXQWVLVVXHVRIµKRUL]RQWDOVFDOH¶In 
practice, much diversity is encountered on regional and sectoral lines within countries 
(Lane and Wood 2009).     
Finally, the literature lacks analysis of the origins and nature of systemic change, 
the realities of political power (see Pontusson 2005) and the material causes and 
consequences of structural crises. Although there have been a number of accounts that 
summarize, develop and/or critique specific aspects of the literature on comparative 
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capitalism (see for example, Allen 2004; Deeg and Jackson 2008; Hancke et al.. 2007), 
there has as yet been a relative lack of attention to the similarities and differences 
between different schools of thought within this broad body of literature, and the 
emerging common ground in explaining systemic crises. This paper has attempted to 
make a start in addressing this important gap.  
The review of literature has drawn attention to key areas that should be addressed 
within the various bodies of literature associated with the general WHUPµFRPSDUDWLYH
FDSLWDOLVP¶These modifications may lead to a better understanding, which might, in 
turn, UHVXOWLQZRUNHUV¶ULJKWVEHLQJPRUHFDUHIXOO\DFNQRZOHGJHGDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\
protected, and firms being better able to address systemic change. In particular, four key 
avenues for future research may help to further enrich our understanding.  The first 
relates to the coverage of work and employment relations in ¿UPLQWHUQDWLRQDOL]DWLRQIn 
order to move knowledge forward in this area, further investigation could be carried out 
in order to map out variations in the actual dynamics of work organization. To address 
current gaps, the empirical work undertaken might usefully pay more attention to both 
advanced and emerging economies. Secondly, in-depth analysis could be undertaken of 
changes over time in national and international regulation, with a particular focus on the 
ideological underpinnings of change.  The third avenue for research would be a greater 
focus on the nestedness of firm, nation-state and international regulation where 
consideration is also undertaken of the internal dynamics of organizations in order to 
better demonstrate the diversity within-country regions and industrial sectors. The fourth 
call is for further analysis of systemic change, with the firm as the central point of focus, 
but taking into account political power and economic causes and consequences of crises. 
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Notes 
 
1
  In the United Kingdom, the growth of penalization, and relatively high levels of defence spending 
(especially RQµELJWLFNHW
 items of military hardware, and on external contractors providing human 
capabilities), shows that the US is not a unique case, even if not approaching the scale of the US.  The same 
could be said for the role of the pharmaceutical industry and its relationship with the university sector. 
 
2
  In recent years, this relationship has not always been a harmonious one, most notably regarding the 
production locale of the new Dreamline (civilian) airliner. 
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Table 1  Keyword search 
 
Keywords Web of Science JStor Scopus 
Comparative capitalism   12 0 9 
Varieties of Capitalism 72 13 309 
Business Systems Theory 7 0 5 
Regulation Theory 148 9 309 
Institutions 4,736 860 64, 912 
Business Systems 295 23 464 
Capitalism 1,160 248 6753 
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Table 2  Comparing strands of the comparative capitalism literature 
 
 Summary of 
approach 
Broad 
weaknesses of 
this strand of 
literature 
Capturing roles of 
diverse 
stakeholders- 
particularly 
labour relations 
Potential for 
explaining 
economic crisis 
and systemic 
change 
 
    
Varieties of 
Capitalism 
How the nature of 
relationships between 
a firm and its 
institutional context 
leads to 
competitiveness 
Tends to discuss 
abstract 
institutions 
rather than real 
world events; 
ignores regional 
differences; 
ignores diversity 
in systems and 
dependencies; 
ignores the fact 
that 
dysfunctional 
system may 
endure.  
Short term and long 
term relationships 
with stakeholders-
including 
employees. Firm 
spheres include 
industrial relations 
system, vocational 
education and 
training, and 
employee 
commitment.  
However, ignores 
security of tenure, 
unionization and 
turnover.  
 
Both VoC and 
BST fail to take 
account of 
temporal diversity 
and  do not 
adequately 
integrate the 
political 
dimensions of 
systemic change 
Business Systems 
Theory 
Relationships 
between a firm and 
its internal and 
external stakeholders 
Does not 
carefully 
evaluate why 
states are 
competitive; too 
much reliance 
on stylized ideal 
types 
Includes 
discussions of 
corporatism and 
neo-corporatism 
(state-worker 
relations), firm 
level employee-
employer 
interdependence. 
and unionization. 
 
 
Regulation 
Theory 
A theory of the 
capitalist production 
process, capturing 
developments in the 
regulatory framework 
and social relations 
Assumption that 
developed 
countries should 
assume similar 
institutional 
forms; ignores 
change caused 
by factors such 
as war and elite 
composition 
Originally included 
discussion of the 
Fordist production 
and labour process.  
Has shifted toward 
a focus on 
competition and 
finance rather than 
the wage-labour 
nexus, but still 
addresses power 
imbalances between 
capital and labour. 
Does not 
adequately 
address  causality- 
why crises come 
at particular times 
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Table 3 Alternative explanations for systemic change 
 
Strand of literature Explanation 
Political economy tradition Economic versus political power 
Extensions of regulationist tradition Continuation of the crisis of fordism 
Exogenous factors Energy and environment 
Political economy/ historical 
institutionalist literature 
Double movement swings between state and 
market 
 
 
 
 
